The novelty of the return of strategic competition has ended, and the term has become familiar to a new generation of Americans. We face potential adversaries endeavoring to undermine the current rules-based international order. Our civilian leadership recognizes this competition, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) places readiness to compete, deter, and win at the center of his leadership approach.

The Surface Navy has responded. We are producing more ready ships available for tasking. Our ships are more lethal and better networked. Manning is slowly improving and our crews are trained for the missions they face. Issues remain in sparing and depot maintenance, but trends are improving. The Force’s modernization and recapitalization plan is poised to meet the demands of a globally postured Navy facing determined rivals. Our results are encouraging and our pride in the Force remains high.

But there is more work to do, and the magnitude of our challenge is substantial. Advantage at Sea, Secretary of the Navy’s (SECNAV) Strategic Guidance, and the CNO’s Navigation Plan all reinforce the centrality of the Surface Force in deterrence, assurance, and warfighting. We will think more deeply about concepts of operation, force generation, force posture, sustainment and integrating future force platforms and capabilities. We will exploit the full capability of the Naval Operational Architecture (NOA), marrying resilient command and control, counter-C5ISR capabilities with persistent targeting to close kill chains faster than our adversaries—even in contested, degraded environments. A lethal, networked, forward-postured Surface Force that underpins the military contribution to integrated deterrence is a Surface Force poised to pivot during crisis and win in conflict.

We call this document “Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge” to emphasize the need for coherence and vision as we confront a world growing more dangerous.
This is not an operational document. We do not tell Navy Component Commanders and Numbered Fleet Commanders how to do their jobs. Rather, we will listen more closely to them to do ours. Our task demands looking forward across a decade in which the Surface Force architecture will change dramatically as ten types of platforms are newly acquired, introduced, or modernized. No one serving in the Surface Navy today has experienced as complex a threat and acquisition environment as we face this coming decade. The Surface Force will act today to integrate, synchronize, and align with all elements of the Joint Force and across all warfare domains to confront these challenges. This document describes those challenges in detail and provides my Commander’s Intent to address them. It looks at mandates to deter, fight, and win, as well as the strategic imperatives of sea control, power projection, and the capability to dominate the oceans. It highlights the emerging Surface Force architecture required for a future fight, incorporating new and modernized platforms, manned and unmanned teaming, and a greater degree of networking. It directs five broad Lines of Effort to align the Surface Force and the Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE), assigning accountability, responsibility, and leadership roles to those lines of operation, and directs action along prescribed timelines. These Lines of Effort direct that we:

- Develop the Leader, Warrior, Mariner, and Manager
- Produce More Ready Ships
- Achieve Excellence in Fleet Introduction
- Create Clear and Innovative Operational Concepts
- Establish Infrastructure for the Future Force

To meet the complexity of the dynamic environment we face in the next decade, we will be proactive and act with urgency. This document directs action to lead the target, thereby providing our ships and crews with the tools they need. Together, we will remove obstacles and break through barriers that impede our success. We can do no less.
Global competition with China and renewed tension with Russia are the main strategic drivers for Navy planners. We are competing with first-rate navies—and other joint sea denial capabilities—whose reach extends far beyond territorial seas. China provides the pacing threat. We focus our discussion in this document on China while being mindful of the unique and considerable threats posed by Russia.

The United States is a global power with a bias to the Pacific, and maintains security interests throughout the Indo-Pacific region, including alliances with five nations and close friendships with myriad others. The peace and prosperity in the region since WWII are a tribute to both the energy and creativeness of the people who live there, and the stability and security provided by these alliances. The United States Navy has been crucial to that stability and security, and our Surface Force has anchored that effort.

Given China’s increasingly aggressive posture in the region, including the assertion of excessive maritime claims, militarization of disputed maritime features, acts of intimidation at sea, and of course, strident rhetoric over Taiwan reunification, the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region is under pressure. To protect U.S. economic and security interests in the region, assure friends and treaty allies, and respond to man-made crises and natural disasters, the United States maintains military and naval power forward in the Western Pacific, much of it composed of the ships and Sailors of the Surface Force. This force forms the vanguard of the Joint Force’s conventional deterrent in the region, and that deterrence takes the form of forces postured to deny or dissuade an adversary from opportunistic, limited aggression, as well as forces over the horizon that add to conventional deterrence by threatening escalated punishment. Conventional deterrence depends on the presentation of numerous operational dilemmas arising from present, powerful, networked, interoperable forces acting with immediacy to aggression.
PROBLEM STATEMENT

For the U.S Navy to maintain its warfighting advantage in the decade ahead as part of the nation’s forward conventional deterrence posture, the Surface Navy will integrate ten new or upgraded types of platforms into the existing force and large scale introduction of several key capabilities. This degree of complexity demands closer alignment across the Force and broader Enterprise, with implications for Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Networks, and Infrastructure (PESTONI).
To deter, fight, and win, the Surface Force will pursue five Lines of Effort (LOE), each of which is described in the following pages. Those LOE are:

- Develop the Leader, Warrior, Mariner, and Manager
- Produce More Ready Ships
- Achieve Excellence in Fleet Introduction
- Create Clear and Innovative Operational Concepts
- Establish Infrastructure for the Future Force

Within each Line of Effort, the Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces assigns an LOE “Owner”, supporting stakeholders and executive level tasks designed to spur deeper inquiry and accountability. Monitoring and reporting of these actions will be incorporated into existing and future Surface Warfare Enterprise processes, and the Commander will provide periodic reports to the community on the progress of these efforts.
Develop the Leader, Warrior, Mariner, and Manager

LOE Owner: CNSF
In Support: CNPC, CNRF, SWSC, CNSL, PERS41, SMWDC, SCSTC

Tasking:

1) NLT 1 Apr 2022, CO SWSC and CO SCSTC will publish a 10-year plan consistent with Ready, Relevant Learning (RRL) to distribute additional mariner skills, Engineering and Damage Control / Firefighting trainers and tactical/technical trainers to support the fleet.

2) NLT 1 May 2022, Commander SMWDC will provide a plan on the Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC), which tracks tactical qualifications, education, currency, and experience throughout a Sailor’s career. We will improve individual tactical competency, align warfighting training across training organizations and identify gaps in warfighting readiness to inform risk calculations and budgeting decisions.

3) NLT 1 Mar 2023, CNSL, with support from CNPC and CO SWSC, will develop and implement an Officer and Enlisted career-long leadership skills feedback and coaching continuum.

The Surface Force builds leaders, warriors, mariners, and managers, and each of these roles requires training, education, and mentoring. While we continue to field increasingly sophisticated technology, the human element remains central. The imperatives of renewed strategic competition and a significantly evolving fleet require us to evaluate how well we carry out these human functions and how well these functions align to the future fleet. The tasks defined within this LOE closely align with the Surface Warfare Navy Leadership Development Framework (NLDF). NLDF’s North Star ensures our Surface leaders—Officer and Enlisted, active and reserve—prepare themselves, their Sailors, and their ships to fight and win. We will set the conditions to achieve this goal, and act now to retain the best and brightest talent.
Our efforts are focused on improving the character, connections, and competence of our force. Our leader development framework strives to develop leaders of integrity with strong and consistent personal character. Today’s formal leadership feedback and mentoring is an ineffective model to encourage positive character development. We will make assessments more frequent and linked to stimulate personal growth. We will strengthen our intellectual and personal connections to build strong teams and greater resilience across the force. These connections generate meaningful relationships, professional enthusiasm, and community discussions leading to healthier and more productive teams. Lastly, we will sharpen our warfighting skills by increasing opportunities for high-quality tactical training, improved education in the art of multi-domain surface warfare in the 21st century, and inculcating warrior toughness throughout the force. Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC) will be the foundation of warfighting excellence, and it will provide deeper insights into how well we train and develop warfighting competence across all warfare areas.

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We will strengthen our intellectual and personal connections to build strong teams and greater resilience across the force.
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Significant investment in Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) trainers will continue so that our bridge and CIC watchstanders are routinely presented with stressing scenarios to build real-world individual and team proficiency. These trainers will continue their present expansion beyond traditional Fleet Concentration Areas, and they will be joined by tactical trainers that leverage the convergence to an Integrated Combat System (ICS).
Produce More Ready Ships

LOE Owner: CNSF
In Support: NAVSEA, NAVSUP, NAVWAR, NAVAIR, NAVIFOR, CNAF, CNRF, OPNAV N95/96, PEO IWS, RMC, SMWDC, SWSC, SCSTC

Tasking:

1) NLT 1 June 2022, COMNAVSEASYSCOM will develop options for an improved surface ship maintenance and modernization plan that supports on time delivery of ships, with the overall goal of reducing amount of days ships are in an availability while considering actions and incentives for strengthening the industrial base.

2) NLT 1 Jul 2022, CNSF Special Assistant for Data Analytics will develop a Surface Force Analytics Plan and Data Strategy to align enterprise efforts on increasing ships ready for tasking.

3) NLT 1 Dec 2022, COMNAVSUPSYSCOM will develop a data-based plan to improve sustainment of the current fleet including a list of critical sparing issues vital to the force’s operational availability and innovative business process changes to ensure spare parts are available when needed.

4) NLT 1 DEC 2022, CNP/PERS-4 coordinate with Fleet Forces Command to support manning requirements outlined in the Optimized Fleet Response Plan to ensure adequate manning for maintenance availabilities.

We will think differently about the fleet we have, and we will consider ways of getting more out of it. More ready ships means harnessing the power of data analytics to anticipate maintenance and modernization requirements that then translate into well-defined, well-executed work packages. More ready ships means getting ships into and out of maintenance periods on time. More ready ships means taking a fresh look at how we schedule maintenance and modernization, with an eye toward more frequent, shorter periods that deliver higher operational availability, while strengthening and reforming the industrial base. More ready ships means being more effective in planning and executing complex depot-level modernization periods that deliver the capabilities called for by the Fleet Commanders’ Baseline Change
and Configuration Plans. More ready ships means evaluating just what “ready” means and considering certification schemes that provide sufficient combat effectiveness and safety without holding the force to a one-size-fits-all notion of readiness. More ready ships means continuing to improve our spare parts processes, to include those that should be carried aboard, those that should be stockpiled strategically, and replacing high failure parts with better, more reliable options. We will begin to treat our shipyards and Tier 2 and 3 suppliers as national assets and track their health and readiness more closely so that we do not find ourselves in dire straits when key manufacturers exit the industry. Again, we will leverage the virtues of data analytics to chart our course and measure our progress toward achieving the outcomes.

"We will leverage the virtues of data analytics to chart our course and measure our progress toward achieving the outcomes."
Achieve Excellence in Fleet Introduction

LOE Owner: CNSL
In Support: OPNAV N2/N6, N94/N95/N96, CNSP, NAVSEA, NAVWAR, NAVSUP, SEA 21, PEO SHIPS, PEO USC, PEO IWS, PEO C4I, ONR
Tasking:

1) NLT 1 Sep 2022, SEA 21, in coordination with OPNAV N2/N6/N94/N95/N96, CNSL, PEO SHIPS, PEO USC, PEO IWS, and PEO C4I will develop fleet introduction plan POAMs for DDG 51 FLTIII, FFG 62, Light Amphibious Warship, LPD 17 Flight II, MUSV/LUSV and DDG(X). The resulting products will be utilized in SWE oversight of new ship class fleet introductions. Lessons learned will be captured and applied to future fleet introduction plans (this development process will be iterative and enduring).

2) NLT 1 Jun 2022, CNSP in coordination with NAVSEA will evaluate the merits of reimagining Fleet Introduction Teams to ensure the smooth transition of new platforms to the fleet. A third party assessment will be conducted to assess all the PESTONI (personnel, equipment, supply, training, ordnance, networks, and infrastructure) pillars.

Our ability to fight and win in today’s strategic environment is made more difficult by an aging Force. We are not replacing hulls on a one-to-one basis; rather, we are building to a new force architecture that features more, smaller ships distributed across a wider geographic area. The degree of complexity of the ships and systems we are adding to the Force is unprecedented in such a short period, and even under far less strenuous circumstances, we have not had recent success in fleet introduction. We are applying lessons-learned from the successes and challenges of past 50+ years of shipbuilding programs including Aegis, LCS, DDG 1000, and FORD programs to establish informed requirements, reduce execution risk, and make robust use of land-based testing to both reduce technology risk prior to ship integration and provide for better in-service training and engineering support. Historical lessons will be applied to new ship designs to ensure required service life allowance margins and ship characteristics enable major capability upgrades more frequently throughout a ship’s life—we cannot afford
to wait until a ship’s mid-life modernization. The bottom line is that we will prepare for this
difficult and complex future, and we will do better.

Within ten years of the release of this document, the following new or modernized platforms
will join the fleet or be in construction:

- ZUMWALT-Class Destroyers (DDG 1000)
- Arleigh Burke-Class Guided-Missile Destroyer DDG 51 (Flight III configuration)
- FLT IIA DDG 51 Class Modernization
- LCS Lethality and Survivability Upgrade
- Constellation-Class Guided-Missile Frigate (FFG 62)
- Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)
- Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSV)
- Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSV)
- San Antonio-Class Amphibious Transport Dock LPD 17 (Flight II configuration)
- Next-Generation Guided-Missile Destroyers (DDG(X))

To this end, the SWE will identify challenges to ship acceptance and Fleet delivery common
to all ship types and create/monitor processes that hold program managers accountable for
these known milestones. Re-inventing processes is expensive and wasteful, and we have
neither the time nor the money to waste. Business Case Analysis will support the maintenance
life cycle of the ship and budgeted appropriately for leaders to make informed decisions.
Class-specific introduction elements should be identified early by program managers, and
in consultation with the SWE, plans should be made to address those elements early and
methodically.

The number of separate operational, logistical, training, administrative, and other support
functions that accompany the introduction of a new ship class is substantial and will be
sustained throughout the life of the class. Doing so for seven new platforms and three
modernized versions will be a tremendous challenge. Further complicating this, across the
Force we will add a next generation family of radars (SPY 6 and its variants), a new electronic
warfare system (SEWIP Block III), and counter-C5ISR capabilities; we will integrate lasers
of increasingly high power, rely more heavily on Integrated Power Systems, and begin to
move towards an Integrated Combat System. All of these platforms and systems will be well-
thought through long before introduction.
Create Clear and Innovative Operational Concepts

LOE Owner: SMWDC
In Support: CNSF, OPNAV N95/96/97/98, N2N6, DWO, CNRF, NAVAIR, NAVIFOR, NIWDC, NWDC, CSDS 1, SWSC, SCSTC, PERS41

Tasking:

1) NLT 1 Mar 2022, SMWDC, in coordination with PERS41, will develop and implement a plan to increase annual Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI) throughput to meet fleet demand.

2) NLT 1 Jun 2022, SMWDC will explore options to bring warfighters closer to the developer. At a minimum:
   a. SMWDC will identify ways to integrate WTIs with Surface Program Offices and Systems Commands (e.g. PEO IWS, PEO C4I, MDA, NSWC) to integrate in the weapon system development process.
   b. SMWDC, with support from OPNAV N96, NAVAIR, SCSTC and others as required, will develop a “capability introduction road map” for the Maritime Strike Tomahawk. In addition, SMWDC will prioritize and develop a timeline for building “capability introduction and integration road maps” for all future ship weapons systems.
   c. SMWDC will produce future warfighting concepts to help shape the weapon system development process. Such concepts include: Hypersonic missiles, SAG operations, USV integration, and the integration of Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations (EABO) into Naval formations.
In support of Fleet Introduction, the requirement for clear and innovative operational concepts is critical. With the number and complexity of systems and platforms planned for acquisition and fielding in the next decade, additional emphasis and rigor will be brought to bear in the creation of supporting concepts and the experimentation necessary to develop them. As part of these concepts, Surface Forces may be postured forward independently, in Surface Action Groups (SAG), as well as in larger fleet formations. The need for specialized doctrine and tactics to support the role these forces play as a part of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Joint Operational Plans (JOP) is crucial.

With the mission of increasing “...the lethality and tactical proficiency of the Surface Force across all domains,” the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) has grown steadily since stand up in 2015. The development of a core of surface warfighting experts within our Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI) cadre, the implementation of Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT), and the review, refinement, and development of doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are on track, and SMWDC has accomplished much to sharpen our professional warfighting skills. In the next decade, SMWDC will continue to grow and evolve. Well-defined operational requirements will be developed and validated. SMWDC will assume the responsibility to develop a comprehensive Surface Force plan through coordination with key requirement, acquisition, testing, training, and warfighting stakeholders. This plan will enable SMWDC to track and align Surface Force testing, experimentation, concept development, and TTP validation on a schedule that supports fleet
introduction. No longer will we field capabilities and then have the Force figure out how to use them. SMWDC will be the center of surface warfighting innovation, experimentation, and virtual warfighting labs. How we operate and fight in the emerging surface force architecture will be developed at SMWDC, with Commander, Surface Development Squadron One (SURFDEVRON 1) providing support and will be integrated into other ongoing joint efforts such as the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC).
Establish Infrastructure for the Future Force

LOE Owner: OPNAV N95/N96
In Support: CNIC, NAVSUP, PEO IWS, OPNAV N98, DWO, NAVAIR, NAVSEA, CNRF, NECC, OPNAV N4, NAVIFOR, PEO SHIPS, PEO USC, CNSP N8/N9, CNSP Special Assistant for Data Analytics

Tasking:

1) NLT 1 Apr 2022, OPNAV N96 will provide the Integrated Combat System (ICS) campaign plan. Plan should outline how evolution from today’s combat system hardware and software (individual ship emphasis) will be implemented through new construction and modernization efforts enabling the foundation necessary for ICS introduction (coordination between ships). PEO IWS will utilize that plan to publish an ICS Roadmap with at least a ten-year horizon, to include (1) establishing the ICS hardware foundation through new construction and modernization; (2) translating existing combat system software capabilities to the ICS hardware baselines; and (3) incremental ICS capability introductions to enable machine speed coordination amongst ICS ships to accomplish force level tasking, kinetic/non-kinetic integration, OTH targeting and engagement, ASW prosecution, and battle management aids. Critical milestones in ICS development, testing and fielding will be addressed to clearly show the incremental capability fielding. The ICS Roadmap will also address the acquisition approach, including trainer development and capacity commensurate with system fielding.

2) NLT 1 Jun 2022, CNSF Special Assistant for Data Analytics will publish Task Force HOPPER Artificial Intelligence (AI/ML) initiatives with a ten-year horizon, to include a digital infrastructure roadmap, integrated with other TYCOM AI/ML Task Forces, and scope required resources to support digital efforts.

3) NLT 1 Dec 2022, NAVSEA, CNIC, OPNAV N95/96, PEO USC, PEO IWS, and CNSL will publish a ten-year plan outlining the roadmap for infrastructure requirements for new class-specific facilities including Land-Based Engineering Sites, training systems, and other general purpose facilities. The roadmap should address the specific POM requirements per cycle to achieve platform fielding plans.
4) NLT 1 Mar 2023, OPNAV N4 in coordination with OPNAV N095/N95, NAVSEA, and NECC will provide a roadmap to field forward deployed expeditionary repair and reload capabilities for surface ships.

The future force will require considerable upgrades to infrastructure, and to re-think how we define infrastructure. Traditional infrastructure (piers, pier services, and buildings/storage) to support ships and crews will be recapitalized after decades of underinvestment. We will ensure that innovative force posture options—both CONUS and abroad—are considered, budgeted, and contracted for well in advance of new platform introduction. As we consider future locations for CONSTELLATION Class Frigates, USVs, LAWs, DDG 1000s and DDG(X) s, we will think through facilities requirements, and how to best use existing infrastructure and develop forward/expeditionary capabilities. Acquisition community is not the right group to be pursuing these questions; this is a Force issue and therefore the waterfront will take responsibility for working with programs to get this right. Decisions will be tempered by affordability and informed by the Strategic Laydown decisions.

Additionally, we will define and budget for appropriate Land-Based Engineering Sites (LBES) to support research, development, and acquisition of major Hull Mechanical and Electrical (HME) systems, combat systems, and training systems. We will flatten the learning curve for fleet introduction of new capabilities by working through design and engineering problems much earlier in the acquisition cycle. We will deliberately reduce execution risk by embracing commonality in using proven Navy standard program of record systems that agilely integrate capability improvements to pace the threat. We will eliminate the lag between fleet introduction and training availability by purposefully delivering them as a comprehensive package—building and maintaining a state-of-the-art LBES is key to doing so.

The architecture of a more distributed, lethal, networked, and integrated future Surface Force is dependent on the promise of the Integrated Combat System (ICS). It is not hyperbole to view ICS as THE FOUNDATION that will enable coordinated actions between ships required to prevail in the future fight.
We have invested considerably in seamanship and navigation trainers and additional tactical/technical trainers—over $5B in investment since 2013—but there is more to do. Live, virtual training will be available both at sea and ashore, and we will increase the realism of our shore based trainers to keep crews in maintenance sharp so that underway time is focused to accomplish training objectives that can best be accomplished at sea.

As warfare and information grow increasingly interconnected, the Surface Navy will require an updated digital infrastructure to remain competitive in a future operating environment characterized by algorithmic warfare, network-centric operations, and complex computing. “Digital infrastructure” refers to the (1) digital talent, (2) digital platforms which enable data exploitation, (3) and new processes for how we conduct business as a community. CNSF’s Task Force HOPPER, in coordination with COMNAVSUBFOR’s Task Force TURING and COMNAVIFOR’s Task Force STATION HYPO, will be responsible for developing a roadmap for these three pillars of digital infrastructure and will align with the overarching Project Overmatch effort.

An improved digital infrastructure will collect, store, transform, and exploit data as a pillar of surface operations. Although not intuitive, we consider “big data” to be part of infrastructure: specifically, how data is managed to generate more powerful and lethal ships, better life cycle support of ships including spare parts, and more effective maintenance and modernization planning. We will view data as a key enabler, and it is crucial that we figure out how best to draw upon and manage that data without creating new and frustrating requirements for ships to update 20th Century databases. Rather, we will absolutely recognize the onerous nature of the current data architecture and streamline it even as we improve it.
The architecture of a more distributed, lethal, networked, and integrated future Surface Force is dependent on the promise of the Integrated Combat System (ICS). It is not hyperbole to view ICS as THE FOUNDATION that will enable coordinated actions between ships required to prevail in the future fight. The increased coordinated capabilities and efficiencies that ICS will bring through effective coordination across the strike group will enable the Surface Force to fight more effectively. As we define and build the evolutionary introduction of ICS from today’s combat system, we will ensure interoperability through common hardware foundations in the existing force (modernization, new construction) and we are honest about sundowning capabilities not up to the task of our pacing threat.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, our Navy has gotten smaller while remaining globally postured. We have been busy, and we have done our job. The nation—and the world—prospered under the security of free seas that we helped provide, and two nations that prospered greatly under that security now appear discontented with the rules of the system that got them there. China built a large and powerful Navy along with a land-based sea denial complex designed to threaten its neighbors and the forces of the United States. Russia is reconstituting its submarine and surface force, arming it with missiles and torpedoes of ever-increasing speed, reach, and lethality.

Our efforts are critical in preserving freedom of the seas, deterring aggression, and winning wars.

The Surface Force will rise to the challenge of strategic competition. The demands of day-to-day conventional deterrence fall heavily on the Surface Force, and it is the activities we undertake during peacetime that will prevent ruinous global war and prevail in the event it cannot be avoided. We will continue to plan to meet these demands, and when resources are made available, they will fall in on mature thinking and plans. We will continue to make the case for necessary resources and prioritize what we absolutely will have to win. We will update, refine, and hone these plans annually, and we will report to each other progress made and headwinds encountered.

The Surface Force is responding to the realities of the modern security environment. Our efforts are critical in preserving freedom of the seas, deterring aggression, and winning wars. We will develop our people, their toughness, and their skills. We will produce more ready ships. We will improve the processes and milestones that move ships and systems from acquisition to fielding. We will improve our conceptual thinking. We will design and build all forms of infrastructure necessary for the future force. The time to prepare is now. Let’s get to work!
# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI/ML</td>
<td>Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>C5ISR</td>
<td>Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting</td>
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<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>CNP</td>
<td>Chief of Navy Personnel</td>
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<td>CNAF</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Air Forces</td>
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<td>CNPC</td>
<td>Commander, Navy Personnel Command</td>
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<td>CNRF</td>
<td>Commander, Navy Reserve Force</td>
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<td>CNSF</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces</td>
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<td>CNSL</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet</td>
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<td>CNOF</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
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<td>CSDS-1</td>
<td>Commander, Surface Development Squadron One (SURFDEVRON 1)</td>
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<td>DMO</td>
<td>Distributed Maritime Operations</td>
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<td>DWO</td>
<td>Digital Warfare Office</td>
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<td>EABO</td>
<td>Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations</td>
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<td>FCA</td>
<td>Fleet Concentration Areas</td>
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<td>HME</td>
<td>Hull Mechanical and Electrical</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Integrated Combat System</td>
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<td>JOP</td>
<td>Joint Operational Plans</td>
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<td>JWC</td>
<td>Joint Warfighting Concept</td>
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<td>LAW</td>
<td>Light Amphibious Warship</td>
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<td>LBES</td>
<td>Land-Based Engineering Sites</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>Lines of Effort</td>
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<td>LUSV</td>
<td>Large, Unmanned Surface Vessel</td>
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<td>LVC</td>
<td>Live Virtual Constructive</td>
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<td>MUSV</td>
<td>Medium, Unmanned Surface Vessel</td>
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<td>NAVAIR</td>
<td>Naval Air Systems Command</td>
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<td>NAVIFOR</td>
<td>Naval Information Forces</td>
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<td>NAVSEA</td>
<td>Naval Sea Systems Command</td>
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<td>NAVSUBFOR</td>
<td>Naval Submarine Forces</td>
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<td>NAVSUP</td>
<td>Naval Supply Systems Command</td>
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<td>NAVWAR</td>
<td>Naval Information Warfare Systems Command</td>
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<td>Naval Expeditionary Combat Command</td>
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<td>NIWDC</td>
<td>Naval Information Warfighting Development Center</td>
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<td>NLDF</td>
<td>Navy Leadership Development Framework</td>
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<td>Naval Operational Architecture</td>
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<td>NWDC</td>
<td>Navy Warfare Development Command</td>
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<td>OFRP</td>
<td>Optimized Fleet Response Plan</td>
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<td>ONR</td>
<td>Office of Naval Research</td>
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<td>OPNAV</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems
Program Executive Office Ships
Program Executive Office Unmanned and Small Combatants
Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Networks, and Infrastructure
Regional Maintenance Center
Ready, Relevant Learning
Surface Action Groups
Commander, Surface Combat Systems Training Command
Director for Surface Ship Maintenance, Modernization and Sustainment
Secretary of the Navy
Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center
Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training
Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum
Surface Warfare Enterprise
Surface Warfare Schools Command
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Warfare Tactics Instructor

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